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1. Introduction 
Social dilemmas pose a problem for society. It is in the collective interest to cooperate in 
order to overcome the dilemma, for instance, in order to provide a public good. However, it is 
in everyone’s private interest to free-ride on other group members to maximize one’s profit. 
The experimental literature has shown convincingly that, even among conditionally 
cooperative individuals, the level of cooperation in social dilemma declines over time in 
repeated interaction unless there is an enforcement mechanism to coerce those who have a 
tendency to free-ride on others or those who follow a self-serving notion of conditional 
cooperation, contributing less than the average group contribution (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 
2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Fischbacher et al., 2012). 
The dilemma becomes worse for smaller numbers of repeated interactions and for 
changing group membership (Grund et al., 2015). Consider a community that wants to 
dispose of different kinds of waste – such as glass, paper, and plastic – properly (a social 
dilemma). During tourist season, typically there are people with a long-term perspective 
(regular inhabitants) and people with a short-term perspective (tourists). In the following we 
refer to permanent group members as Perms and to temporary group members as Temps. 
Perms remain in their group for the entire repeated interaction, whereas Temps change 
groups every period (see, relatedly, Angelova et al., 2012; Grund et al., 2018). 
Our experiment employs a mechanism which has been shown to enhance voluntary 
cooperation and efficiency in public goods provision, namely leading by example (e.g., Güth 
et al., 2007; Potters et al., 2007; Rivas and Sutter, 2011; Drouvelis and Nosenzo, 2013; 
Brandts et al., 2016; Drouvelis et al., 2017; Gächter and Renner, 2018). Will it be able to 
counterbalance or at least weaken the negative effects due to the co-involvement of Perms 
and Temps in a public goods game? Specifically, we assign leadership to a pair of Perms, 
respectively Temps, in a public goods game with two Perms and two Temps in the group, 
compared to a control condition with simultaneous contributions. 
Our main results show surprisingly that “leading by example” in the interaction between 
Perms and Temps in social dilemmas leads to even lower contributions than without 
leadership. This result is largely driven by the behavior of Perms. While Perms tend to 
provide a good example as leaders, they are contaminated by the bad example of less 
contributing Temp-leaders. 
 
2. Experimental design 
Participants play a linear public goods game in groups of four members for ten periods. In 
each period, each member receives an endowment of 20 tokens and decides on how much 
to contribute to a private and to a public good, respectively. The payoff function for subject 
𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4 is 
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where ci is the contribution of subject i to the public good. Assuming that subjects are selfish 
and rational, the dominant strategy for any marginal per capita return below one is to free 
ride, i.e. to contribute nothing to the public good. 
For opportunistic (own payoff maximizing) subjects, the dominant strategy is to free 
ride, i.e. to contribute nothing to the public good. Whereas common free-riding lets each earn 
20, each would earn 40 when all fully contribute. 
Each subject is for the entire ten periods randomly assigned to the role of a Perm or 
Temp. Groups consist of two Perms and two Temps. Perms stay together with the same 
Perm, while Temps switch to different new groups after each period, and participants are 
aware of this group restructuring. Participants are explicitly informed that the two Temps will 
never belong to the same group in two consecutive periods, i.e. Temps confront three new 
interaction partners in the next period, Perms – only two. 
The three conditions vary the timing of the contributions. In the control condition 
SIMULT, Perms and Temps contribute to the public good at the same time (simultaneously). 
In condition PERMFIRST, both Perms contribute simultaneously and independently before 
both Temps contribute simultaneously and independently, aware of previous contributions of 
the other type. In condition TEMPFIRST, both Temps contribute before the two Perms 
decide. At the end of each period, subjects are informed about the contributions of all four 
group members and their own payoff. 
A novel aspect of this experimental setup is that there is strategic uncertainty in both, 
leading and following. Leading by example has been mostly investigated with only one leader 
confronting one or more followers so far. Leaders have to anticipate how followers behave. 
Followers may face the conflict between following a good example, when they are 
reciprocity-inclined, or to yield to free-riding incentives. Both, regardless whether they are 
leaders or followers, also may be concerned how the other Perm, respectively Temp 
behaves. 
Points earned in the experiment are added up and converted to EUR at an exchange 
rate of 25 points = 1 EUR. Average earnings are 11.9 EUR. Subjects receive their payments 
in cash at the end of the experiment.1 Every subject participated in one condition only. We 
recruited 72 subjects per condition with ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Subjects in each condition 
were divided into six matching groups (i.e. independent observations) of 12 subjects. 
Subjects were assigned and reassigned to a group of four only within their own matching 
group. Except for the restricted re-matching, all design details were common knowledge 
                                            
1 Before the main part of the experiment we elicited conditional contributions, following Fischbacher et 
al. (2001). Feedback for the elicitation was given only after the main part. 
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among participants. The experiment was programmed with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). The 
neutrally framed experimental instructions (see Online Appendix, Part B) were read aloud. 
Roles Perm and Temp were neutrally denoted as roles A and B. 
 
3. Results 
We start by looking at average contributions by condition. Figure 1 plots average 
contributions (left panel) and average contributions over time (right panel) by condition.  
 
 
  
Figure 1: Average contributions by condition and type of group member 
 
As can be seen, average contributions amount to 11.5 out of 20 tokens in condition 
SIMULT. Leadership, when two Perms and two Temps interact, clearly does not lead to 
higher average contributions. In PERMFIRST, average contributions are 10.2, and in 
TEMPFIRST they are 7.5. Leadership seems to reduce the average contribution not only 
overall but also for the two group member types. Despite the lower contribution levels, we 
confirm the usual tendency of the leaders to contribute more than the followers, where this is 
more pronounced for Perms as leaders than for Temps as leaders. There is only a small 
“tenure effect”, manifested in SIMULT by the positive difference between the average 
contribution of Perms and Temps. The “leadership effect” in PERMFIRST strengthens this by 
enlarging the difference. In TEMPFIRST, both effects go in opposite directions with the 
leadership effect being stronger. In the right-hand panel of Figure 1, it is easy to discern that 
all conditions and all types display declining contributions over time. 
The regression analysis in Table 1 provides estimates from GLS regressions. We 
account for repeated decisions by the same subject and correlated decisions within the same 
matching group by including subject-specific random effects and by clustering standard 
errors at the matching-group level. Results are robust to using Tobit random effects models. 
We compare individual contributions across conditions for all subjects in model (1), and 
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separately for Perms in (2a) and Temps in (2b). Models (3a)-(3c) use condition- specific data 
to compare average contributions of Perms to those of Temps within the same condition. 
Finally, model (4) includes all possible interaction effects between condition and type of 
group member for the whole dataset. 
 
Dep. variable: 
Individual contribution 
All 
(1)  
Perms 
(2a) 
Temps 
(2b) 
PERM-
FIRST 
(3a) 
SIMULT 
(3b) 
TEMP-
FIRST 
(3c) 
All 
(4) 
        
PERMFIRST dummy -1.321 -0.356 -2.286*    -2.286* 
 (1.0094) (1.2037) (1.2916)    (1.2916) 
        
TEMPFIRST dummy -3.958** -5.128*** -2.789*    -2.789* 
 (1.6083) (1.8096) (1.6462)    (1.6462) 
        
Perm dummy    3.286*** 1.356 -0.983 1.356 
    (1.008) (1.194) (0.632) (1.1212) 
 
PERMFIRST dummy * 
Perm dummy 
 
TEMPFIRST dummy *  
Perm dummy 
       
1.931 
(1.4675) 
 
-2.339* 
(1.2686) 
        
Period -0.517*** -0.496*** -0.537*** -0.556*** -0.471*** -0.524*** -0.517*** 
 (0.0697) (0.0787) (0.0852) (0.119) (0.0809) (0.168) (0.0697) 
        
Constant 14.30***  14.87*** 13.74*** 11.56*** 13.37*** 10.88*** 13.63*** 
 (0.910) (1.192) (1.081) (0.926) (1.192) (1.769) (0.9674) 
 α(PERMFIRST) = 
=ß(TEMPFIRST), 
(p-value of Wald test) 
 
0.0867 
 
0.0016 
 
0.7749 
    
 
Observations 2160 1080 1080 720 720 720 2160 
No. of subjects 216 108 108 72 72 72 216  
Note: Coefficients from GLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses, random effects on the subject level 
and standard errors clustered at the matching group level, reference category in (1), (2a), and (2b) is SIMULT; 
(3a,b,c) use only condition-specific data, reference category is Temp; * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Table 1: Explaining individual contributions  
 
Model (1) shows that leadership leads to lower average contributions, which is only 
significant in TEMPFIRST. Models (2) reveal the reason for the overall difference between 
SIMULT and TEMPFIRST. While Temps reduce their contributions to a similar extent in 
PERMFIRST and TEMPFIRST, compared to SIMULT, see (2b), Perms contribute much less 
in TEMPFIRST, see (2a). Both, PERMFIRST and TEMPFIRST, confirm that leaders 
contribute more, but the effect is only significant in PERMFIRST, see (3). When contributions 
are made simultaneously, Perms and Temps contribute similarly. This is another surprising 
and interesting result since at least the two Perms interact repeatedly. Apparently just one 
constant partner when interacting with three others does not suffice to trigger significant 
repeated interaction effects. The decline of contributions over time is very similar across 
conditions and types. Model (4) confirms the insights from models (1) to (3) (see also Online 
Appendix, Part A). 
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What drives the behavior of Perms in the role of followers? The analysis of group 
dynamics combined with initial behavior provides some insights.2 In period 1, Perm-leaders 
and Temp-followers do not display different average behavior than in SIMULT. In contrast, 
Temp-leaders and Perm-followers contribute less. In the following periods of all conditions, 
Temps positively link their contribution to the latest contribution of Perms. The contribution of 
a Perm in SIMULT and PERMFIRST is positively affected by both, the latest contribution of 
the other Perm, as well as the latest average contribution of both Temps, with the relative 
importance of the two being similar. This is quite different in TEMPFIRST, where Perms 
completely neglect the behavior of their fellow-Perm and only follow the Temps. This leads to 
a spiral during play of the experiment in TEMPFIRST: Temps start off with a lower 
contribution than in SIMULT, Perms follow them; in the next period, Temps reduce again, 
following Perms, Perms in turn follow Temps, and so on. This explains why average 
contributions over the ten periods in TEMPFIRST are lower than in the other two conditions. 
To sum up, introducing leading by example in groups consisting of permanent and 
temporary group members does not increase average contributions compared to the case, 
when contributions are made simultaneously. While Temps contribute similarly as leaders 
and as followers, Perms contribute much less as followers. This is, because as followers, 
Perms condition their contributions only on the contributions of the Temp-leaders, whose 
initial contributions are low, and later on themselves conditioned on the average contributions 
of Perms. The leadership of Temps possibly makes the one-shot nature of the interaction 
with them more salient for Perms. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We implement leadership without coercive, i.e. sanctioning, power using a “leading by 
example” mechanism in a public goods setting with groups consisting of two Perms and two 
Temps by letting the two members of the same type, Perm versus Temp, contribute either 
before or after the other type. Only the control let all four members decide simultaneously. 
Our setup thus captures field social dilemma cases whose parties differ in tenure. 
Surprisingly, leadership in interactions of Perms and Temps leads to even lower 
contributions than in the control condition. This questions existing results of no negative and 
mostly positive effect of leading by example on voluntary contributions in cooperation games. 
Our effect is mainly driven by Perms. While Perm-leaders try to provide a good example, 
Perms’ contributions decay very quickly when Temps lead. 
How to explain this surprising result? Possibly, the novelty of our design, namely the 
strategic uncertainty in both, leading and following, creates additional coordination problems. 
                                            
2 Here we only report the results. The complete analysis is provided in Online Appendix, Part A. 
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An interesting extension of our design would be a setup with only one leader and three 
followers. 
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Online Appendix (not for publication) 
 
Appendix A Regression Analysis 
 
Regression model (4) in Table 1 
Regression equation:   
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 =  α ∙ PERMFIRST dummy + β ∙ TEMPFIRST dummy + γ ∙ Perm dummy + δ ∙
PERMFIRST dummy ∙ Perm dummy + μ ∙ TEMPFIRST dummy + λ ∙ period + const + ε𝑖𝑡 
 
Table A1 reports the p-values from the post-estimation Wald tests related to regression (4) in 
Table 1 and the corresponding interpretation. The insights confirm those from models (1) to 
(3) in Table 1. 
 
Null hypothesis of  
Post-estimation Wald tests 
p-value Interpretation 
α = β 0.7749 Temps contribute similarly in 
PERMFIRST and TEMPFIRST.  
α = 0 0.0767 Temps contribute less in 
PERMFIRST than in SIMULT. 
β = 0 0.0902 Temps contribute less in 
TEMPFIRST than in SIMULT. 
α = γ + δ   0.0069 In PERMFIRST, Perms contribute 
more than Temps. 
γ = 0 0.2267 In SIMULT, Perms and Temps 
contribute similarly. 
β = γ + μ 0.3294 In TEMPFIRST, Perms and 
Temps contribute similarly. 
γ + δ  = γ + μ 0.0001 Perms contribute less in 
TEMPFIRST than in PERMFIRST. 
γ = γ + δ   0.1883 Perms contribute similarly in 
SIMULT and PERMFIRST.  
γ = γ + μ 0.0652 Perms contribute less in 
TEMPFIRST than in SIMULT. 
 
Table A1. Results from post-estimation Wald tests 
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Dependent variable: 
individual contribution 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SIMULT SIMULT PERMFIRST PERMFIRST TEMPFIRST TEMPFIRST 
 Perm Temp Perm Temp Perm Temp 
       
Lagged contribution by the 
other Perm 
0.304*** 
(0.0917) 
 0.273*** 
(0.0965) 
 0.0468 
(0.0817) 
 
       
Mean lagged contribution 
by the two Temps 
0.190*** 
(0.0547) 
 0.219*** 
(0.0751) 
   
       
Mean lagged contribution 
by the two Perms 
 0.0850*** 
(0.0157) 
   0.284*** 
(0.0691) 
       
Lagged contribution by the 
other Temp 
 -0.0378 
(0.0565) 
 0.0209 
(0.0274) 
 -0.00568 
(0.0422) 
       
Mean contribution by the 
two Perms 
   0.579*** 
(0.120) 
  
       
Mean contribution by the 
two Temps 
    0.804*** 
(0.0922) 
 
       
Period -0.386*** -0.454** -0.250 -0.246** -0.150* -0.322** 
 (0.0817) (0.224) (0.160) (0.102) (0.0842) (0.150) 
       
Constant 8.467*** 12.56*** 7.876*** 2.583** 0.990 7.672*** 
 (1.954) (2.198) (1.228) (1.098) (0.882) (1.807) 
       
Observations 324 324 324 324 324 324 
Number of subjects 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Note: Coefficients from GLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses, random effects on the subject level 
and standard errors clustered at the matching group level, * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, comparison of the 
coefficients for the contributions, Wald tests: p=0.2697 in (1), p=0.0726 in (2), p=0.7499 in (3), p=0.0000 in (4), 
p=0.0000 in (5), p=0.0028  in (6). 
Table A2. Individual contributions explained by the current and past contributions of the 
different group members, by type of group member and condition 
 
In Table A2 we study how individual contributions are affected by the information about 
the latest contributions of the other group members. For each group member type and for 
each condition, we regress the individual contribution on the two latest contributions seen by 
the individual before making a decision. For instance, the latest contributions a Perm-leader 
would see, would be those by the other Perm and the other two Temps in the previous 
period. The latest contributions a Temp-follower would see, would be those of the two Perms 
in the same period and that of the other Temp in the previous period. For simplicity and 
without loss of generality, we always take the average of the two contributions by the group 
members of the opposite type. 
Our regression analysis shows that Temps follow the behavior of Perms in all 
conditions, neglecting what the fellow Temp does. When deciding simultaneously or first, 
Perms’ contributions are positively and significantly correlated with the contributions of all 
other group members. Thereby, the behavior of the other Perm is as important as that of the 
Temps. When deciding as followers, Perms pay attention to the average contribution of the 
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two Temps (correlation is positive and significant), neglecting the behavior of their fellow 
Perm.  
Table A3 reports differences in first-period behavior across conditions. Perms 
contribute similarly in SIMULT and PERMFIRST. The same is true for Temps. In 
TEMPFIRST, both the contributions of Perms and Temps are below the respective ones in 
SIMULT.  
Taking together the insights from Tables A2 and A3, it seems that SIMULT and 
PERMFIRST do not differ much with respect to first-period behavior and group dynamics 
during the experiment, while behavior in TEMPFIRST is different for both. This explains the 
differences in average contributions between TEMPFIRST and the other two conditions. 
 
 
Dep. var.: 
Individual contribution 
(1) (2) (3) 
in period 1 Perm Temp All 
    
PERMFIRST 0.500 -0.583 -0.0417 
 (1.126) (1.543) (0.876) 
TEMPFIRST -2.917* -3.417* -3.167** 
 (1.577) (1.668) (1.354) 
Constant 12.81*** 13.36*** 13.08*** 
 (1.025) (1.009) (0.607) 
    
Observations 108 108 216 
R-squared 0.054 0.054 0.052 
 
α(PERMFIRST)= 
β(TEMPFIRST) 
 
0.0167 
 
 
0.1275 
 
 
0.0350 
Note: OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at the matching group level,                               
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A3. Comparison between conditions in period 1 
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Appendix B Experimental instructions 
 
The original instructions were in German. We provide a translation for condition 
TEMPFIRST. In Italic font and in brackets, we indicate how the instructions differ from those 
in the other conditions. 
 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your participation! 
 
From now on, please do not talk to other participants. 
 
 
General information 
 
This is an experiment on economic decision-making. During the experiment, you can earn 
money. After the experiment you will receive the money privately and in cash.  
 
The experiment will last approximately one and a half hours, and consists of 2 parts. At the 
beginning of each part, you will receive detailed instructions. Both parts are independent of 
each other. Decisions made in one part will not affect your payoff in the other part. Your total 
payoff from the experiment will be equal to the sum of your payoffs from part 1 and part 2. 
We will inform you about your total payoff after part 2 is finished.  
 
If you have questions at any time during the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the 
experimenters will come and answer your questions privately. 
 
During the experiment, we will ask you and the other participants to make decisions. You will 
also be interacting with other participants. This means that your own decisions as well as the 
decisions of the other participants may affect your payoff. 
 
Payoffs 
During the experiment, we will talk about points instead of euros. These points will be 
converted to euros at the end of the experiment. We will inform you about the exchange rate 
for each part separately. 
 
Anonymity  
We never relate names to decisions in the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will 
be requested to fill out and sign a receipt for accounting reasons. Our accountants will also 
not be able to relate your name to your decisions. 
 
The decision situation 
We will first explain the decision situation. After that, we will ask you to answer some 
questions on your screen that will help you to better understand the decision situation. 
Finally, we will explain your task in part 1.  
 
You will participate in a group of four. Every group member will have to decide on how to use 
her 20 points. You can deposit them in your private account or you can contribute all of them 
or part of them to the group account. Every point that you do not contribute to the group 
account, automatically goes to your private account. 
 
 
Income from the private account 
Each point that you deposit in the private account, earns you exactly one point. For 
instance, if you deposit 20 points in the private account, you will earn exactly 20 points from 
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the private account. If you deposit 6 points in the private account, you will earn 6 points from 
the private account. Nobody besides you earns money from your private account. 
 
Income from the group account 
All four group members profit in the same way from the amount that you deposit in the 
group account. This means that you will also benefit from the amounts that other group 
members deposit in the group account. The income of each group member from the group 
account is given by:   
 
 
Individual income from the group account = Sum of the contributions of all four group 
members to the group account  0.5 
 
For example, if the sum of the contributions of all four group members to the group account 
is 80 points, then each group member will earn 80  0.5 = 40 points from the group account. 
If the four group members contribute a total of 10 points to the group account, each group 
member will receive 10  0.5 = 5 points from the group account. 
 
Total income 
Your total income is equal to the sum of your income from the private account and your 
income from the group account. Hence,  
 
Income from the private account (= 20 – contribution to the group account) 
+ income from the group account (= 0,5  sum of the contributions to the group account) 
= total income 
 
Quiz 
Before you read further, we would like you to answer some questions on your computer 
screen. If you would like to perform calculations now or later during the experiment, you may 
use the Windows Calculator. If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will come 
and answer them in private. 
 
 
Part 1 
Task eliciting conditional contributions. Instructions are available upon request. 
 
(Instructions for Part 2 were distributed after Part 1 was finished. Participants received 
feedback about Part 1 after Part 2 was over.) 
 
Part 2  
 
Part 2 consists of ten identical periods. In every period, you will face the decision situation 
described above. In the following we will describe some additional aspects.  
 
Unconditional contribution 
In each period of part 2 you will provide only your unconditional contribution.  
 
Two types of participants 
Every participant will randomly be assigned to either role A or role B. You will have the 
same role in all periods (i.e., you will always be participant A, if you start as participant A; 
you will always be participant B, if you start as participant B). You will be informed about your 
role on your computer screen when the experiment begins.  
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Group composition 
Your group consists of four members: two participants A and two participants B. Both 
participants A will stay together in the same group for the entire 10 periods. In contrast, 
every participant B will switch to a new randomly selected A-A-group in every period. No 
participant B will meet the same other participant B in two subsequent periods. 
 
Sequence of decisions 
First, both participants B [PERMFIRST: A] will simultaneously decide on their individual 
contributions to the group account. Then, both participants A [PERMFIRST: B] of the same 
group will be informed about the individual contributions of participants B [PERMFIRST: 
A] to the group account. In the end, both participants A [PERMFIRST: B] will 
simultaneously decide on their individual contributions to the group account.   
 
[SIMULT: All participants will always decide simultaneously on their individual contributions 
to the group account.] 
 
Information at the end of each period 
At the end of each period, you will be informed about how much each of the other group 
members contributed to the group account and how much you earned in that period. 
 
Payoff at the end of part 2 
Your final payoff is the sum of your payoffs in each period. The exchange rate for part 2 is  
 
25 points = 1 EUR 
 
The payoff that you earn in part 2 will be paid to you together with your payoff from part 1 
privately and in cash in the end of the experiment.  
 
After part 2 is over, we will ask you to answer a questionnaire. Please do truthfully answer 
our questions since they are very important for our research. Of course, all your answers will 
remain anonymous. After you fill out the questionnaire, the experiment will be over. You will 
be informed about your payoffs from parts 1 and 2 and you will receive your final payoff 
privately and in cash.  
 
